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Introduction
We were raised as a partisan nation. The only bipartisanship you ever see is when they finally
sign a bill and everybody says 'Gee, isn't that wonderful.'
-Colin Powell
The divisiveness of the current political climate is well known. We have seen the
growing divide between Republicans and Democrats play out in our government, on social
media, and even in our own homes. Controversial issues seem to be dividing both average
Americans and our elected officials, and we see political conflict, accusations, and a lack of civil
discourse take place on a daily basis. Following the election of President Donald Trump in 2016,
this conflict has only intensified, culminating in a very partisan impeachment earlier this year.
This state of partisan warfare, which our representatives have both inherited and contributed to,
might lead one to proclaim that bipartisanship is dead. A look at roll call voting data would
reinforce that conclusion and show a clear ideological divide. A study of the ideological
positions of voting senators in the last few decades would show a growth in the distance between
the two parties (Lewis et al, 2018). After the disappearance of conservative Democrats and
liberal Republicans, the gap between the two parties has only continued to grow. Today,
compromise seems more unlikely than ever.
The popular narrative of the slow death of bipartisanship does not, however, tell the
whole story. While senators may remain ideologically divided on controversial topics that
dominate headlines and capture the attention of the nation, there is significant cooperation going
on behind the scenes. Even as roll-call voting has become more partisan, bipartisanship still
exists, just not in a way that we pay attention to. Behind the scenes, legislators are building and
maintaining bipartisan relationships with their colleagues through bill cosponsorship. This
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activity can range from a rather insignificant bill naming a building to major welfare reform.
Cosponsorship is widely ignored by interest groups, the media, and the public. Because of this,
legislators often use bill cosponsorship as a mechanism of position taking aimed at their
colleagues rather than external audiences (Kessler & Krehbiel, 1996, p. 563). As Rippere (2016)
notes, because the majority of the literature that shows that the two parties are becoming more
polarized over time has been limited to the study of members’ voting behavior, it is important to
look at bipartisanship in relation to bill cosponsorship (p. 243). Simply looking at the “yeas” and
“nays” of a bill does not give the full picture of the state of bipartisanship in the chamber. The
statistics of roll-call voting may show what looks like a partisan or bipartisan vote, but it does not
show the senators who collaborated and cosponsored to make that vote happen. It is of particular
importance to observe cosponsorship in the Senate. Despite the increase in polarization, senators
have built cosponsorship networks with almost an equal number of their same-party and
opposite-party colleagues, while members of the House of Representatives have associated
increasingly with their fellow partisans (Rippere, 2016, p. 252). The Senate is nowhere near free
from partisan conflict, but senators have maintained a significant number of bipartisan
relationships through the act of bill cosponsorship. Has an increase in polarization had any effect
on the frequency of this legislative activity? Can the good will of major bipartisan
accomplishments in one session of Congress carry over to the next and encourage more
cooperation, or could it just be mere opportunism?
The literature on political polarization and bipartisanship is plentiful, but very few have
specifically studied how bipartisan cosponsorship has changed in light of the growing partisan
divide, or why that particular legislative activity is even important to begin with. Using Senate
cosponsorship data from the 93rd to the 115th session of Congress, this paper argues that
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cosponsorship patterns show an increase in hidden bipartisanship despite an increase in the
polarization of roll-call votes. First, I will detail the evolution of party polarization. Having
presented that background, I will then provide a brief history of bipartisanship, its advantages,
and the obstacles that it has faced and continues to face in the context of the current divisive
political climate.

Evolution of Party Polarization
The polarization that we see today is not exactly a complete departure from the history of
partisan politics since the Federalist period. Some amount of partisan conflict has plagued our
government at almost every moment. We can at least be grateful that we do not have to deal with
the routine electoral violence experienced in Antebellum America, in which politics was a kind
of war and, indeed, led to war (Freeman, 2018). Today, the political arena involves more of an
ideological battle than a physical one, but how did we get here?
During the 1950s and early 60s, there was an unwritten rule of ideological moderation in
the Senate (Moore & Thomas, 1991, p. 963). Not adhering to that standard would reduce a
senator’s chance of passing their agenda because the legislation of a senator who is more willing
to compromise would be better received than that of an extremist. More than half of the members
of the U.S. Congress at that time were moderate in their voting records, and many were willing
to negotiate their ideological differences in order to pass legislation (West, Sorens, Burrus &
Kabaservice, 2019). Following the standard of moderation, the first changes in party polarization
can be seen around the time of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. After President Lyndon B. Johnson
sent a voting rights bill to Congress, a bipartisan committee added amendments to strengthen the
bill (“The Senate Passes the Voting Rights Act”, 2019). The bill received crucial Republican

5
support, and would have likely failed otherwise due to opposition from a number of Democrats
in the Senate. As the legal barriers that prevented African Americans from voting were removed,
the demographic changes in the South forced Democratic Senators to liberalize at times as they
became more dependent on African American voters (Fleisher, 1993, p. 328). At the same time,
the Republican Party was becoming more competitive in the South and began to make more
appeals to white conservatives. While the southern realignment was driven in part by race,
Trende (2010) notes that by the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the South was already aligned with the
Republican Party on a number of issues, such as taxes, abortion, school prayer, and Vietnam.
Regardless of its cause, the southern realignment was the first significant change in the political
landscape to have an effect on political polarization.
As Bonica (2014) notes, party polarization in Congress can take place through member
replacement, in which incoming legislators that are more ideologically extreme replace more
moderate legislators, or through ideological migration, in which sitting legislators drift away
from the ideological center as their careers progress (p. 6). Overall, member replacement
accounts for 55% and migration accounts for 45% of the total increase in polarization since the
92nd Congress (Bonica, 2014, p. 12). Member replacement can typically be attributed to changes
in a senator’s constituency or growing demands of party loyalty from leadership (Fleisher &
Bond, 2004, p. 430), and it was the main driver of polarization from the early 1970s through the
mid 1990s, beginning with the southern realignment (Bonica, 2014, p. 12). Southern districts that
traditionally elected conservative Democrats began electing moderate or conservative
Republicans, causing the beginning of the disappearance of the political center. Similarly,
Fleisher and Bond (2004) contend that parties polarized due to a shrinking number of partisan
nonconformists, or moderate members who have policy preferences that are different from the
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ideological mainstream (p. 430). As these nonconformists were replaced, the divide between the
two parties grew.
While member replacement was the main cause of party polarization until the mid-1990s,
ideological migration began to occur around the 105th Congress. Polarization by means of
ideological migration can occur either as a smooth, well behaved trend in which senators
gradually change their policy positions, or as migration shocks, in which periods of accelerated
polarization interrupt an otherwise smooth polarization trend (Bonica, 2014, p. 15). Events such
as the budget crisis of 1995, the Clinton impeachment trial, the run up to the Iraq War, and the
Affordable Care Act have caused such shocks to the trend, which then becomes the new normal.
Certain legislative battles or periods of heightened partisan tension can have lasting effects on
Congressional polarization.
Accompanying the increase of polarization is the decrease in major legislative
accomplishments, especially during the last two decades. The Affordable Care Act (ACA), the
Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, and the stimulus package all managed to pass during the
Obama administration, but did so with staunch Republican opposition, and they remain the
subjects of harsh criticism to this day (Gordon & Landa, 2017, p. 1436). Even when a major
bipartisan bill is passed, there is a tendency for both parties to try to claim it as their own victory.
Polarization can certainly be an obstacle to creating major legislation with bipartisan support.
Jones (2001) found that higher party polarization in a chamber can increase system-wide
gridlock (p. 133). Depending on the size of the majority, unified government can be just as prone
to gridlock as divided government if party polarization is high. If the majority party does not
have enough seats to thwart filibusters or vetoes, then clashes with the minority party will
inevitably be a significant obstacle to producing legislation, and that may be worsened by high
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polarization. As long as polarization continues to increase, gridlock and a lack of productivity
will continue to plague the legislative process.
Polarization has not affected both parties equally. As Ezra Klein (2020) notes, Democrats
have to appeal to a very diverse constituency whereas Republicans are overwhelmingly
dependent on white voters. The need for Democrats to appeal to nearly every demographic under
the sun is a very powerful limit on how far left their ideology can move. They have to speak to
everyone from the far left to the center-right in order to hold power while the Republican Party
can aim their campaigns well to the right of the median American. A Pew Research Center report
found that Republicans and Republican-leaning independents viewed many heavily relied on
sources across a range of platforms as untrustworthy, while Democrats and Democrat-leaning
independents viewed them as credible and relied on them to a greater degree (Jurkowitz,
Mitchell, Shearer & Walker, 2020). Democrats’ levels of trust and distrust in media sources have
changed considerably less than Republicans’ over time, which may have something to do with
the ability of the Republican Party to move farther right. The difference in polarization could
mean that Democrats have more of an incentive to pursue bipartisanship because of their need to
appeal to the center-right in order to capture votes.

Bipartisanship in Action
Roll call voting tells one story of bipartisanship, but the actions of senators themselves
tells another. Bipartisanship can be seen in unexpected ways that counter the narrative that
Republicans and Democrats cannot get along. Senators form bipartisan relationships outside of
the chamber that may encourage them to work together on the Senate floor. The Senate Dining
Room, which used to be a liberating space to share thoughts and ideas with Senate colleagues,
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remains vacant more often than not, but lawmakers manage to cultivate bipartisan relationships
through other means (Parker, 2014). New bipartisan traditions have replaced the old with the
occurrence of a weekly bipartisan prayer breakfast, informal bipartisan dinners, and even
interactions at the Senate gym. Mark Warner (D-VA) has organized many meetings, retreats, and
dinners at various places throughout Washington D.C. to bring together Democrats and
Republicans (Baker, 2015, p. 23). He has been a member of several bipartisan “gangs” as well:
of Five (deficit), of Six (revenues and entitlements), and of Eight (immigration reform). Through
these informal associations, bipartisan groups of senators work together to try to circumvent the
gridlock produced by polarization. While bipartisan friendship might not bring Republicans and
Democrats together on abortion, immigration reform, or gun control, it can create pathways for
future collaboration on other important pieces of legislation. The relationship between partisan
opponents is not nearly as bleak as it is portrayed in the media, which is a hopeful sign for the
future of cooperation.

Advantages of Bipartisanship
In Federalist 10, James Madison defined a faction as a number of citizens, majority or
minority, who are united and actuated by a common passion or interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens or the interests of the community as a whole (Madison, 2001). All people are born
with different abilities, and when the government protects these unequal abilities, it results in
“different and unequal faculties of acquiring property.” (Madison, 2001). This creates a diversity
of interests and opinions amongst men, and society is divided according to these interests.
Because the causes of faction are sewn into the nature of man, the best way to solve the problem
of faction is to multiply them. There is such a diversity of interests that factions will need to join
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together and form coalitions in order to form a majority, and these majorities will always be
changing because new factions will form as new issues arise. Bipartisanship was not an issue at
the time that Madison wrote because a two-party system had not yet developed. Nevertheless, he
could see the need for factions with different interests to join together and cooperate on different
issues, as Republicans and Democrats have to do today. While the divide between Republicans
and Democrats is clear, there are still ideological differences within each party and room for
common ground. Major, long-lasting legislative innovations will need bipartisan support if they
are to survive the possible swing of the ideological pendulum in the next election, and this
requires that both parties work together to form a majority coalition. Ideally, the majority party
will refrain from certain actions against the minority party, as they will eventually lose that
majority. There also is an incentive to work with the minority party and prevent gridlock when
the majority is less than the two-thirds necessary to end a filibuster. From the time of the
Federalist Papers through today, forming a majority coalition that can unite both sides of an
issue has serious advantages.
The roots of compromise and cooperation extend all the way back to the Great
Compromise. As the issue of congressional representation was dividing the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, Roger Sherman proposed a compromise: proportional representation in the
House of Representatives and equal representation in the Senate. Without this agreement, who
knows what would have become of our republic? Our history has involved a lot of compromise
and collaboration, from Abraham Lincoln appointing his Republican rivals to his cabinet in 1860
to Congress establishing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which
would put a man on the moon over a century later in 1969. Some of our best ideas and greatest
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achievements have been the result of putting our partisan differences to the side to pursue a
higher goal. Moreover, bipartisan efforts often have the ability to stand the test of time.
When it comes to major legislative innovations, it can be difficult for both parties to
come to a consensus, but a bipartisan effort will likely create a bill with more staying power. In
1964, the Senate passed the Civil Rights Act 73-27, with 27 Republican votes (Purdum, 2018).
Republican Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen aided the passage of the bill after he was
reassured by the Democrats that they would not weaponize the bill during the presidential
election later that year. Bipartisan cooperation is what made long-lasting progress possible.
Having the minority party on board increases the chances that it will stick around. Baker (2015)
notes that forcing legislation on a slim minority produces unsatisfying results. Every Republican
in the Senate voted against the Affordable Care Act. The bill has since been challenged several
times in federal courts and there have been numerous attempts to repeal it. Because of the
partisan nature of the vote, the topic of health care reform continues to dominate public debate
and divide politicians. If the policy preferences of some progressive senators like Bernie Sanders
(I-VT), who advocates for “Medicare for All”, are ever realized, that too would be unlikely to
garner bipartisan support. Parties exist for a reason, but pushing major legislation on a unified
minority will have consequences when that minority gains control or the coalition that formed
the temporary majority fails to hold.
Bipartisanship is not always possible, but it is important to find the areas of compromise
and agreement where they exist. Vanden Heuvel (2014) claims that legislators do not need to
sacrifice their beliefs at the “altar of bipartisanship” in order to pass legislation that has a wide
appeal. Despite their ideological differences, Senators David Vitter (R-LA) and Sherrod Brown
(D-OH) both opposed government bailouts for banks, and they took advantage of this common
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interest to persuade the government to study whether big banks were receiving more favorable
debt pricing. There are still areas of overlap to be found between the two parties, which creates
an opportunity for bipartisan cooperation. Real bipartisanship is not a shift towards centrism, but
it aligns more closely with what Vanden Heuvel calls “transpartisanship”: it encourages solutions
that align with many viewpoints rather than taking two existing viewpoints and splitting the
difference.
Just like partisanship, bipartisanship is a useful political tool. It is an efficient electoral
strategy that politicians can use to broaden their appeal to voters outside their party. According to
Trubowitz and Mellow (2005), bipartisanship is most likely to occur when the national economy
is growing, the political parties are competitive nationally, and control of the federal government
is divided (p.437-438). Although nationalizing politics can also push partisanship, it can give the
parties an incentive to cooperate. When parties are regionally polarized, legislators have more of
an incentive to tailor their policy stances and voting records to their partisan bases, and there is
less of an incentive to work with the other side. During divided government, it may be more
difficult for political leaders to produce the policies they want, so they have to remain reliant on
cooperation from moderates from the opposing party. Even when political polarization is high
and government is divided, bipartisanship can be a method to overcome that and produce
moderate, yet important, legislation.
While it may be a useful tool, there is a proper way to employ it, and it should not be
pursued for its own sake. Bipartisanship can provide long-lasting solutions to complex political
problems, but its value should not be overstated. When it is pursued for its own sake rather than
for the sake of good ideas, the result is usually a poorly conceived or underdeveloped bill. Baker
(2015) points to the STOCK Act and JOBS Act as perfect examples of merely cosmetic
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bipartisanship (p. 77). Their narrowness and lack of ideological burden made the bills seem
appealing to a gridlocked Senate, but in reality, they were of dubious quality and contained
internal contradictions which arose from the desire for bipartisanship itself. Congress may want
to pass something that would show the public that they can cooperate and create meaningful
legislation, but substance should always be more important than the appearance of
bipartisanship.

Obstacles to Bipartisanship
Our government was made to be antagonistic from the beginning with the introduction of
checks and balances. As James Madison wrote in Federalist 51, “Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.” (Madison, 2001). Each branch of government has its own will in order to
remain separate from the others, allowing the branches to check the others in the hopes of
enhancing their own the power. This natural competition is a good thing, but it is not always
going to be friendly to cooperation and bipartisanship. The existence of political parties
themselves heightens this level of competition and creates further division. By definition,
political parties are necessary in order to have bipartisanship, yet their existence also seems to be
the biggest obstacle to cooperation. George Washington warned of this in his Farewell Address,
where he expressed his fear that the “spirit of revenge” would cause political parties to govern
for the sake of their power and not for the sake of the people (Washington, 1813). This “spirit of
revenge” can create an environment that is even more hostile to cooperation, as the parties have
their own ambition and agendas to pursue while the executive and the legislative branch also
compete for power. These natural obstacles are a good thing, as a slower, more deliberative
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government will filter out all the bad ideas and possibly abusive agendas, but in light of
increased polarization, it is also the first of many roadblocks that bipartisanship has to overcome.
Party leaders are one of the most significant modern obstacles to bipartisanship. They are
not always encouraging of bipartisanship, as they have to minimize divisions within the ranks of
their party. They have the responsibility of trying to maintain or increase their number of seats
while safeguarding party principles, so bipartisan proposals can present a challenge to them
(Baker, 2015, p. 51). Because of that responsibility, they would not support a bipartisan proposal
that strays too far from the fundamental party doctrine. A certain amount of party loyalty is
required of legislators, and members will often go along with leadership even if they differ on
the policy (Lee, 2009, p. 39). The party has campaign funds and resources that legislators do not
have, and reelection can rest on support from the party and the endorsement of prominent
members. Breaking with the party may be too big of a risk to take. If a legislator is facing a
challenge in the next election by a member of their own party, then the support of the party
leader could make a significant difference, and it would benefit them to conform to the party
platform. To a certain extent, being a party leader also involves doing what you can to make the
other party look bad. Baker (2015) argues that party leaders cannot engage in bipartisanship if it
involves giving political cover to an opposition senator who is up for reelection (p. 48). Their
role at times requires that they secure the success of the party at the expense of bipartisanship. In
2012, Senate majority leader Harry Reid opposed many bipartisan initiatives in an effort to
preserve the Democratic majority. That may seem counterproductive, and it may even turn away
undecided or centrist voters, but the competitive nature of partisan politics often demands
partisanship and party loyalty if senators wish to retain their seat.
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As Poole and Rosenthal (1984) suggest, polarizing interest groups also have a significant
influence, and this can present another challenge to cooperation (p. 1075). Interest groups will
often “score” certain votes in order to assess whether or not a member’s voting record is
consistent with their own principles or legislative agendas. It is a way to signal to voters and
other members of the party that a legislator is defecting from the party’s preferred position.
Baker (2015) notes that during the 113th Congress, Senators Joe Manchin (D-WV) and Pat
Toomey (R-PA) proposed an amendment on expanded background checks for firearms
purchases in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shooting (p. 44). The vote was scored by the
National Rifle Association (NRA) and was defeated in the Senate 54-46. The vote scoring by
such a prominent gun rights advocacy group may have exerted pressure on Republican senators
to stay in line with the party’s position on gun control. Manchin believed that if the vote had not
been scored, it would have passed, as it was a bipartisan amendment. Vote scoring can reach
beyond pieces of legislation. Baker (2015) also points to the confirmation of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor (p. 43). The NRA scored that vote as well to encourage senators to vote against the
nomination, and it worked, because only 7 Republicans voted in favor. Interest groups exert a
certain amount of pressure on legislators that may discourage them from breaking with the party
or supporting more moderate legislation. The support of these groups is contingent on consistent
support for the policies that they are in favor of, and neglecting to do so could have
consequences for the legislator’s next election. In a way, the interest groups prevent senators
from forming their own factions. This seems contrary to the Madisonian solution of a
multiplication of factions. It could be more beneficial to political polarization to allow different
factions and groups to form within or between parties.
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The atmosphere of the Senate floor itself can be another obstacle. Bipartisan legislation
may seem promising while it’s still in a committee, as a committee’s size and more intimate and
familiar nature can make them a safe place for bipartisanship, but the Senate floor is a much
more partisan environment. A senator might offer an amendment to a bill that has more to do
with delivering a message to the other party than it does with improving the bill, and
“messaging” bills are occasionally introduced to promote the political goals of one party while
demeaning the other (Baker, 2015, p. 69). The amendment process can kill meaningful bipartisan
legislation if senators have their own agenda to pursue. In March of 2020, Senators Lisa
Murkowski (R-AK) and Joe Manchin (D-WV) introduced the American Energy Innovation Act,
a bipartisan energy package (Hulac, 2020). Shortly after being introduced, more than 150
amendments were introduced, and any hope for its quick passage was dimmed as the bill became
dragged in multiple different directions. Senator John Kennedy (R-LA) threatened to object to
every amendment unless the Senate voted on his bipartisan measure first. Clashing interests and
contradicting amendments can kill the most bipartisan of bills.
The American electorate also presents an obstacle of its own to bipartisanship.
Constituents have their own preferences that they expect their elected representatives to remain
true to. Baker (2015) argues that legislators cannot simply defy public opinion to work together,
or else they will be replaced by someone who will fight the partisan battle (p. 104). The public
even prefers partisanship at times. Harbridge and Harrison (2014) found that bipartisan
legislation is not preferred over partisan wins. When partisans understand the extent of the
compromise made in the policy process, they see the bipartisan legislation as a loss for their
party (Harbridge & Harrison, p. 339). As party polarization increases in Congress and in the
public, voters are having an increasingly negative view of the opposing party (Abramowitz &
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Webster, 2018, p. 132), and they may demand more partisanship of their representatives. As this
trend continues, it becomes more and more unlikely that we see major legislation passed with
bipartisan support.
The modern political party also includes more than just constituents. Legislators have to
appeal to interest groups, consultants, 527s, which are tax exempt groups to raise money for
political activities, and even the partisan media (Koger, 2010). Senators today do not always
have the ability to cooperate. The choice of whether or not to break with the rest of their party
may be out of their hands if they wish to be re-elected. The obstacles to passing bipartisan
legislation are even greater in light of political polarization, and this could have a negative effect
on bipartisan cosponsorship.

Bipartisan Events of Interest
In my study of bipartisan cosponsorship, I have selected five bipartisan events to focus
on, each roughly a decade apart: The Endangered Species Act (1973), Social Security Reform
(1983), Welfare Reform (1996), Gang of 14 (2005), and the 21st Century Cures Act (2016).
These “events” are considered to be bipartisan because they represent the passage of important
legislation with bipartisan cosponsorship, legislation that resulted from negotiation between the
divided executive and Congress, or measures taken by senators of opposing parties to overcome
partisan conflict. Each is a significant display of bipartisan cooperation during periods of either
divided government or high partisan conflict that has had a lasting effect on the political
landscape.
Endangered Species Act (1973): 93rd-94th session
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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted in 1973 in the 93rd session of Congress
during a period of divided government. President Richard Nixon wanted to make changes to U.S.
environmental policy, so Representative John Dingell (D-MI) and Senator Harrison Williams (DNJ) led the effort. The original proposal in the House had 15 Democratic cosponsors, 8
Republicans, and 1 independent. The Senate bill that replaced it and eventually passed had 5
Democratic and 3 Republican cosponsors (“Library of Congress”, n.d.). It was unanimously
approved in the Senate and passed 390-12 in the House of Representatives (“History of
Bipartisanship”, n.d.). In recent years, Republicans have tried to narrow the scope of the law,
pointing to the burden that it places on landowners and its hindrance on economic growth
(Friedman, 2019). This led to the “modernization” of the act in 2019 by the Trump
Administration, which changed the way the act is applied in an attempt to soften that burden and
allow for a more clear and consistent implementation of the law. Representative Rob Bishop (RUT) claimed that under the Obama administration, the act had been used as a “political weapon
instead of a tool to protect wildlife” (Friedman, 2019). Bipartisan support for the ESA has
remained strong since 1973, but Republicans and Democrats have tweaked it over several
administrations in order to better serve their policy goals. While Republicans see it as being
overly restrictive to business, Democrats want to increase protections to address the threat of
climate change. The act may face further alteration in future administrations, but its strong roots
in bipartisanship is what keeps it intact.
Social Security Reform (1983): 97th-99th sessions
Social Security was a difficult and highly partisan issue to confront. During the Reagan
presidency, the Social Security Trust Fund was likely to begin running a deficit, and there was a
crisis that needed to be addressed (“History of Bipartisanship”, n.d.). President Reagan had to
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work with a large Democratic majority in the House of Representatives in order to solve the
problem. The initial White House plan was strongly rejected 96-0 in the Senate and had a
majority of bipartisan opposition in the House (Dallek, 2009). Following that failure, a bipartisan
commission was created to make recommendations, with members appointed by Reagan and
House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA). After the commission made their recommendations,
Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) and Bob Dole (R-KS) led a bipartisan group of
legislators to create the necessary amendments (History of Bipartisanship, n.d.). The final
version was introduced by Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) and received one
Democratic and one Republican cosponsor (“Library of Congress”, n.d.). Dallek (2009) notes
that the compromise strengthened the position of Social Security’s defenders. Ironically, Reagan,
who had once argued that Social Security should be a voluntary program, was now established as
its defender. This bipartisan effort has had a lasting effect on the way lawmakers approach Social
Security reform. Very few elected officials openly endorse plans to privatize Social Security or
make it voluntary, positions that Reagan himself had previously supported.
As impressive as the 1983 reform was, Smith (2014) argues that in reality, it was a
“bipartisan effort to kick-the-can.” The majority of the tax increases and the benefit cuts targeted
future generations. The baby boomers entered the workforce and created a surplus, but now some
argue that the Social Security problem is again approaching a crisis. As political polarization has
significantly increased since 1983, another bipartisan solution to the Social Security problem
may be easier said than done.
Welfare Reform (1996): 103rd-105th sessions
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, a sweeping
change to the country’s welfare system, was enacted during the 104th session of Congress.
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During a session that was marked by divided government and two government shutdowns,
Congress worked with the White House to strengthen work requirements and child support
enforcement while increasing spending on education and childcare (“History of Bipartisanship”,
n.d.). Having vetoed two earlier versions, President Bill Clinton worked with a Republican
Congress to secure the passage of the legislation. While it did not receive any cosponsors, it was
made possible by a bipartisan negotiation between President Clinton and Representative Newt
Gingrich (R-GA), whose support was necessary in order to get the conservative votes it needed
to pass. The House voted 328-101 to pass the bill, with 98 Democrats joining 230 Republicans.
In the Senate, the bill passed 74-24, with 23 Democrats joining 51 Republicans to vote in favor.
All but 3 of the bill’s opponents were Democrats, but the amount of bipartisan support was
significant. Clinton (2006) remarked that “I was widely criticized by liberals who though the
work requirements too harsh and conservatives who thought the work incentives too generous.”
Three members of his administration eventually resigned in protest. Clinton recognized that
neither side got what they hoped for, but claimed that neither side betrayed their principles in
coming to the compromise. Had he not made the concessions that liberals were so critical of, the
act would have likely failed to get the Republican support it needed to pass. Cooperative
government is “a measure of strength, deeply rooted in our Constitution and history, and
essential to the better future that all Americans deserve, Republicans and Democrats alike.”
(Clinton, 2006).
Gang of 14 (2005): 108th-110th sessions
The compromise of the “Gang of 14” came during the 109th session of Congress.
Democrats killed President George W. Bush’s nominations of conservative appellate court
judges by filibustering 10 of his nominees during the 108th session and threatening to filibuster
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more (“‘Gang of 14’ Averts Judicial Shutdown”, 2006). Republicans had a 55-vote majority, and
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) threatened to use the “nuclear option,” or change the
rules of the Senate to allow a simple majority to end debate on judicial nominations. Democrats
in return threatened to shut down the Senate. As a solution to this partisan standoff, 14 Senators,
seven Democrats and seven Republicans, created a truce by forming the “Gang of 14.” In this
compromise, the Democrats agreed that they would not filibuster judicial nominations, except in
the case of “extraordinary circumstances,” and Republicans would not take up the “nuclear
option.” This was an important attempt by a bipartisan group to combine forces and avoid the
gridlock produced by partisan conflict (Baker, 2015, p. 46). Had a similar gang been formed in
2013, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid might not have abolished the filibuster, which created
a precedent that Mitch McConnell would expand in 2017. The failure to compromise and refer to
past examples of bipartisanship can have lasting consequences and contribute to further divide.
21st Century Cures Act (2016): 113th-115th sessions
The 21st Century Cures Act was signed into law by President Obama on December 13,
2016. It provided the National Institutes of Health with the resources to expand biomedical
research, created more collaboration among government and private sector researchers, and
allowed for faster drug approval (“History of Bipartisanship”, n.d.). It received 4 Democratic and
3 Republican cosponsors. Similar Senate bills were introduced with bipartisan cosponsors, and
those bills were eventually replaced by the House bill (“Library of Congress”, n.d.). While health
care legislation can be a very combative and partisan issue, the bill easily passed both chambers:
94-5 in the Senate and 392-26 in the House. Despite some progressive critics, among them being
Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), claiming that the bill gave too many
concessions to pharmaceutical companies, President Obama praised the bill, stating that, “The
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bipartisan passage of the 21st Century Cures Act is an example of the progress we can make
when people from both parties work together to improve the health of our families, friends, and
neighbors” (DeBonis, 2016). The changes made by the Cures Act have had real results as well.
The Food and Drug Administration approved about a third more new drugs since 2017 than it did
in the last two years of the Obama administration (Chamberlain, 2020). While the more partisan
Affordable Care Act has faced many challenges since its passage, health care legislation can be
lasting and effective, so long as it is the result of compromise and receives bipartisan support.
Despite polarization being at an all-time high, important pieces of legislation and acts of
bipartisanship can still find a way.

Methodology
In order to assess how bipartisan cosponsorship in the Senate has changed within the
context of increased party polarization in roll-call voting, I used legislation data from the
GovTrack database. The database has complete information for all bills and resolutions that have
been introduced from the 93rd session of Congress through the current session. I focused only on
bills with one sponsor or cosponsor from each party that originated in the Senate and were signed
into law. I also chose to concentrate on specific sessions of Congress in which important
bipartisan achievements were made. As stated above, those bipartisan moments are as follows:
The Endangered Species Act (1973), Social Security Reform (1983), Welfare Reform (1996),
Gang of 14 (2005), and the 21st Century Cures Act (2016). In addition to isolating the sessions of
Congress that contained the bipartisan achievements, I examined the session prior to and the
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session immediately following each event.1 This would indicate whether an important bipartisan
event in a certain session would encourage senators to reach across the aisle and if it would have
an effect on future cosponsorship.
Using the GovTrack database, I obtained data for the following sessions: 93-94
(Endangered Species Act), 97-99 (Social Security Reform), 103-105 (Welfare Reform), 108-110
(Gang of 14), 113-115 (21st Century Cures Act). For each of those sessions, I compiled a list of
the enacted Senate bills that had at least a sponsor and cosponsor from each party and compared
that to the total number of Senate bills that were enacted in that session. From this I was able to
determine the percentage of enacted Senate bills that had bipartisan cosponsors.
In compiling and analyzing the data, I also found it useful to consider the party of the
President in office, as well as the majority party in the House of Representatives and the Senate
during that session. This information is helpful when considering the context in which a change
in bipartisan cosponsorship is occurring, and could indicate whether or not divided or unified
government has an effect.

Results
Table 1 and Graph 1 present the percentage of enacted Senate bills that received
bipartisan cosponsors for the sessions before, during, and after each bipartisan event. Graph 2
isolates the total number of enacted Senate bills during each session.

1

The exception being the 92nd session, the session prior to the 1973 Endangered Species Act in
the 93rd Congress, as GovTrack only provides complete cosponsorship information for bills back
to 1973.

23

24

25
The bipartisan events that preceded an increase in the percent of bipartisan cosponsorship
are the 1983 Social Security Reform in the 98th session, the 2005 Gang of 14 in the 109th session,
and the 2016 21st Century Cures Act during the 114th session. From the 98th to the 99th session,
there was a significant increase from 45% to 63%. Following the 109th and 115th sessions, there
were smaller increases of 6% and 3%, respectively. The other two bipartisan events, the 1973
Endangered Species Act and 1996 Welfare Reform, were followed by decreases in bipartisan
cosponsorship in the sessions following. There was a 6% decrease following the 93rd session and
a 11% decrease following the 104th. The existence of a bipartisan event, like a major bill with
bipartisan cosponsors or the formation of a bipartisan “gang”, does not always result in an
increase in cosponsorship in the following sessions.
The selected sessions in which the bipartisan events occurred always had at least a
slightly higher rate of bipartisan cosponsorship than the session before.2 This could indicate that
that session was slightly less partisan than the one before and resulted in more bipartisanship, or
it could be following a trend of increased cosponsorship over time. A major bipartisan
achievement during a session may foster more collaboration between partisan opponents during
that session.
The presence of divided or unified government does not seem to have much of an effect
on cosponsorship. While bipartisanship is thought to be more present in divided government
(Trubowitz & Mellow, 2005, p. 445), the 115th session, during which there was unified
government, saw the highest rate of bipartisan cosponsorship out of all sessions studied. There
was an increase in bipartisan cosponsorship after the 103rd session, which marked the transition

2

With the exception of the 92nd session, for which there is incomplete data.
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from unified to divided government during the Clinton presidency, but that was followed by a
decrease in the 105th session as Republicans maintained control of Congress.
As the number of enacted bills with bipartisan cosponsorship has increased, the total
number of bills passed has decreased. As seen in Graph 2, the decrease is not consistent and
some sessions are not accounted for, but the selected sessions suggest a slight decrease over
time. There were 260 Senate bills enacted in the 93rd session and 133 bills enacted in the 115th
session. As the number of bills enacted has decreased, more of them are receiving bipartisan
cosponsors. The study of bipartisan cosponsorship in the sessions before, during, and after the
five bipartisan events suggests an overall increase the number of bills that receive bipartisan
cosponsorship relative to the total number of bills passed.

Discussion
Despite the apparent increase in political polarization, the number of enacted Senate bills
with bipartisan cosponsors relative to the number of total Senate bills passed has increased, and
may continue to do so. This upward trend in bipartisanship seems to be contrary to the narrative
of political polarization. If the gap between the parties is increasing, why is it that 83% of Senate
bills passed during the last session were bipartisan? How do we account for an increase in this
act of hidden bipartisanship within the narrative of an increase in polarization?
It should be noted that the use of the word “bipartisan” does not always have to imply
support of the majority of the two parties. It can be difficult to determine how exactly to gauge
bipartisan support. It could mean a bill with one cosponsor from each party like the Maritime
SAFE Act, or it could mean the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal
Enforcement and Deterrence Act with 84 cosponsors (Tauberer, 2018). One of a bill’s bipartisan
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cosponsors may be one of only few members of that party to actually support it, although that
would be contrary to what Baker (2015) suggests about a legislator’s loyalty to their party and
the party leader. Based on what Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) say about cosponsorship as
mechanism of position-taking, even a bill with only one sponsor from each party sends a
message to other legislators that their colleague believes this bill to be of bipartisan support.
While the existence of only one cosponsor from each party does not imply overwhelming
bipartisan support, it can still be an example of a bipartisan effort. Establishing a threshold of
how many cosponsors is needed for a piece of legislation to be bipartisan would be purely
arbitrary, so here, it signifies bills that have at least one sponsor or cosponsor from each party.
It is worthwhile to consider how this increase in the percentage of cosponsored bills fits
in to the overall history of cosponsorship in Congress. Cosponsorship was first permitted in the
Senate in the 1930s, but was not allowed in the House until 1967, when a resolution was
introduced to allow 10 cosponsors per measure, a limit which was later expanded to 25 and
removed entirely in 1978 (Campbell, 1982, p. 415; Wilson & Young, 1997, p. 26). It could be
that as former House representatives were elected to the Senate, there were new cosponsorship
norms to which they needed to become accustomed. This could explain the lower percentage of
cosponsored bills in the 93rd session compared to the 115th. Once the limits on cosponsors were
removed, it may have taken time for legislators to embrace it as a useful political tool.
Different levels of polarization in the Senate chamber may affect the number of bills that
the Senate is able to pass. As the two parties have moved farther apart ideologically, legislators
may have made a move to work together on modest, bipartisan legislation in the absence of more
major, ideologically divisive bills. It could represent the Senate’s effort to deliver some kind of
legislation to the American people, no matter how moderate it may be. It may indicate that the
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more partisan bills are not getting through, and if they are, they are likely not originating in the
Senate. The increase seen may not be due to a compromise on key issues, but it could be a
representation of how senators have been able to find minor or more moderate issues to address.
A number of the bills may not even be moderate legislation, as nearly one-third of the laws
passed by the 115th Congress were ceremonial in nature, meaning they awarded medals,
designated special days, authorized commemorative coins, or memorialized a historic event
(Desilver, 2019). The 115th session was the third Congress in a row in which the ceremonial
share increased. While the increase in bipartisan cosponsorship may represent the Senate’s
achievement of moderate bipartisan legislation, the increasingly ceremonial nature of the bills
passed must also be considered.

Conclusion
While there has been a decrease in bipartisanship in roll call voting in the last few
decades, the opposite is true of cosponsorship. Senators are still finding common ground and
collaborating on important legislation to address the needs of the American people, but they are
just doing it in a way that receives less attention. As polarization increases, cooperation still
manages to find a way to exist in the form of bipartisan cosponsorship. Looking at politics
through a lens of cosponsorship gives us a different picture of what is going on than what we see
through the lens of partisan conflict.
As Richard Brookhiser (2009) argues, “parties exist for reasons—they express clashing
ideas and interests in society”. Bipartisanship is important and necessary, but only if it is in the
pursuit of the best ideas. A record of being moderate and cooperating with your partisan
opponents may look good to voters on paper, but the substance of the bills behind that record
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matters. Not everything can, or should, be bipartisan, but legislators still manage to find common
areas of interest in order to address pressing issues.
Trubowitz and Mellow (2005) claim that bipartisanship may be abnormal, but it does
occur (p. 435). I would argue that it is only abnormal when it pertains to major legislation or roll
call voting. Bipartisan agreement on abortion, health-care reform, and gun control would
certainly be abnormal, but senators build and maintain strong relationships with their partisan
opponents that often leads to collaboration and cosponsorship. The perceived ideological divide
is more significant in some areas than in others. Foreign policy is thought to generate more
bipartisanship because of the number of ideological and interest conflicts that plague domestic
policy (Trubowitz & Mellow, 2005, p. 447). Despite the conflicts that exist in domestic policy,
there are still overlapping interests and policy goals that senators take advantage of. Every year,
the National Taxpayers Union publishes a list of “No Brainers”, or legislation that has received
bipartisan support and provides a solution to a real problem, not just naming a building or
creating a commemorative coin. Things like the Financing Our Energy Future Act, which would
allow renewable energy projects to have the same tax treatment as non-renewable energy
projects, or the Taxpayers Right-To-Know Act, which would increase transparency in
government by requiring federal agencies to disclose information about the cost and performance
of the programs they administer (Aiello, 2019). So far, both of those proposals have bipartisan
cosponsors yet neither have passed. None of the “no brainers” of the 116th session have passed
yet, and only one was passed during the 115th session. Important bills that receive bipartisan
cosponsors that should be easy to pass often times die in committee or are set aside to pursue a
more partisan agenda. The percent of bipartisan cosponsored bills has increased, but more
meaningful acts of cosponsorship are often lost in the sea of party polarization.
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The findings of this research support the conclusion of Rippere’s (2016) study of why
bipartisan pairs of legislators collaborate through cosponsorship despite heightened polarization.
The level of polarization varies depending on the type of legislative activity. The study of rollcall voting alone is not sufficient to gain an understanding of the level of bipartisanship today. A
study of cosponsorship shows how a more hidden act of bipartisanship has managed to survive
despite the apparent partisan warfare, and it provides more context to counter the narrative that
bipartisanship is dead. It is an important aspect of bipartisanship to consider when assessing how
polarized the two parties are.
It is important to note the limitations of this study of bipartisan cosponsorship. By
focusing on a select number of sessions between the 93rd and 115th sessions of Congress, the rate
of bipartisan cosponsorship in between the sessions of interest are not accounted for. There may
be considerable increases or decreases in the rate of bipartisan cosponsorship during those
periods that may shine a different light on bipartisanship and how it has changed over time. The
study is also limited in that it focuses on enacted Senate bills rather than all bills introduced in
the Senate. A narrow scope was helpful, as a majority of bills proposed in the Senate die before
they reach the Senate floor (Wilson & Young, 1997, p. 31). Senators can choose to cosponsor a
bill at any point during the bill’s life cycle. Therefore, a focus on cosponsorship of only the bills
that survive each stage may not paint the whole picture of bipartisan cooperation. However, it
also may be that the rate of bipartisan cosponsorship would be lower in a study of total Senate
bills introduced, as many bills die before ever receiving a cosponsor. Nevertheless, it is fair to
conclude that an increase from 47% in the 93rd session to 83% in the 115th session represents a
promising change in a certain kind of display of bipartisanship. A percentage increase of that
magnitude cannot be dismissed easily.
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This research is an attempt to expand the lens with which we use to examine party
polarization and the state of bipartisanship. Bipartisanship varies depending on the kind of
legislative activity, and this should be taken into account when considering the divide between
the two parties. These findings suggest that bipartisanship is still very much alive in the form of
cosponsorship, and it is a useful tool for legislators to overcome party polarization. Further study
of bipartisan cosponsorship could expand the findings of this research by studying cosponsorship
during each session beyond the focus of certain bipartisan events. This would allow us to
understand the greater trend of bipartisan cosponsorship and how it has changed alongside party
polarization.
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